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Video tutorial · 1:38

Risk Scoring: Threat vs Exposure

Every endpoint in the catalog is scored on two independent axes, not one. This is the model's core idea: "is it being attacked?" and "is it vulnerable?" are different questions, and collapsing them into a single number would let a storm of ordinary misconfiguration flags drown out one real attack — or vice versa.

The two axes​

AxisLifetime fieldActive fieldQuestionNature
Threatmax_risk_scoreactive_risk_scoreIs something dangerous happening?An event — active attack / abuse
Exposuremax_posture_scoreactive_posture_scoreHow open / vulnerable is the endpoint standing still?A state — config hygiene

At a glance — severity weights feed the two independent axes, which combine as a 2x2 for prioritization:

Which axis a flag feeds is fixed per flag in the collector's severity catalog ("posture": true = Exposure), not derived from its class:

  • Threat — the active findings: BOLA, BFLA, brute force, payment abuse, scanner UA / vuln probe / path scan, replay, rate and IP-rate anomalies, impossible travel, PII observed, oversized response, error-rate spike, unsafe method on a read-only path, threat-intel hit, and the derived auth_inconsistent.
  • Exposure — the standing posture: unauthenticated, plain-text / weak TLS, missing HSTS / CSP / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options, permissive CORS, the CORS-credential flags (cors_credentials_wildcard, derived cors_origin_reflection), credential_in_query, basic_auth_plaintext, the cookie flags, weak_token_ttl, version_disclosure and error_status — plus the info-tier context flags (internal_host, external_host, legacy_protocol, sensitive_path_keyword, client_error_status, latency_anomaly, geo_change, unverified_proxy_tls, derived mixed_auth_schemes), which score 0.

The UI renders the two axes in distinct colour families (Threat = red family, Exposure = blue/purple) so they never read as the same number. The per-flag axis, severity and class are listed in the Risk Flags Reference.

Severity weights​

Each risk flag has a coarse 0–10 severity weight. Operators tune detector thresholds, not individual flag weights:

SeverityWeightMeaning
Critical10Exploitable now — no further pivot needed
High7High-confidence attack signal or hardened-posture failure
Medium4Suggestive state — normal in moderation, alert on clusters
Low1Ambient context
Info0Descriptive context, not a finding — shown, scored 0, excluded from "flagged" counts

Per request the collector computes both axes:

  • Threat is max-anchored: the worst threat severity plus the remaining threat severities divided by 4 (integer division), clamped to 255. A lone Critical outranks a pile of Mediums, and concurrent findings still add — gently.
  • Exposure is the clamped sum of the posture severities (clamped to 255).
Ordinary backend errors don't inflate Threat

A 5xx storm (error_status, Low) or a missing security header raises Exposure, never Threat. The top of a Threat-sorted list is real attack signal.

The UI bands a score for badge colour: 0 none · 1–9 low · 10–24 medium · 25–39 high · 40+ critical.

Lifetime vs active scores​

The inventory keeps the lifetime maxima max_risk_score / max_posture_score ($max-merged — the worst request ever seen; derived flags are not part of them). Lifetime scores only rise, so on their own they cannot answer "is it still bad?".

The backend therefore also reports an active score for every row, computed from the flags that are still active:

  • A stored flag is active while its last sighting (flag_last_seen.<flag>) is inside the active window — policy.risk_active_days (default 7, 1–90). The per-row cutoff is max(now − risk_active_days, scores_reset_at), so a Reset or Rebaseline makes every earlier sighting historical at once.
  • The active flags are re-scored with the collector's own scoring function (threat = max + Σrest/4, posture = sum), each axis clamped to the row's lifetime maximum.
  • The severity of each active derived flag is added on top (auth_inconsistent → Threat; mixed_auth_schemes and cors_origin_reflection → Exposure), capped at 255. See derived flags.

The active score is what the product shows and sorts by: the endpoint list and attack-surface badges, the min_risk_score / max_risk_score filter, the New APIs / PII / Auth Coverage lists and the CSV export all use it. A row last seen before the active window scores 0. Hovering a badge shows the lifetime max, and a green ↓ marks a row whose active score is below its lifetime peak — it was remediated or the attack stopped. The Zombies dashboard is the one exception: a zombie is silent, so its active score is almost always 0 and it ranks by lifetime scores instead.

Current posture (ClickHouse window)​

An endpoint's detail page also has a current posture panel computed from the raw ClickHouse events over the last window_days (default 7, max 7), bounded below by the row's last reset. It reports the current max threat/exposure, flags, PII categories, auth markers, event and shield-block counts, and whether the endpoint is dormant (no traffic in the window). When ClickHouse is unavailable the panel degrades to the lifetime values with an inline note.

Security Score​

The Security Score dashboard rolls one time window (default 1 hour, max 7 days) into a single 0–100 score with a letter grade — A ≥ 90, B ≥ 80, C ≥ 70, D ≥ 60, F below, N/A when it cannot be computed. It is built from five pillars:

PillarWeightScore (each term truncated, pillar clamped 0–100)Minimum sample
Auth coverage0.30100 − 100 × unauthenticated write ops / write ops≥ 5 write operations
Transport security0.25100 − 100 × weak-transport events / total≥ 50 stored events
Risk exposure0.20100 − 1.5 × p95 risk − 50 × critical events / total≥ 50 stored events
Attack surface0.15100 − 50 × external ops / ops − 100 × sensitive ops / ops≥ 5 operations
Threat activity0.10100 − 500 × threat-intel hits / total − 100 × scanner/bot events / total≥ 50 stored events

The pillars count only accepted anonymous traffic as a gap — an event the upstream accepted without credentials and that raised the collector's unauthenticated finding (so mTLS, session-cookie, signed-URL and webhook-signature callers and monitors do not count). An authenticated public API is not attack surface, and health/info probes (/health, /healthz, /livez, /readyz, /ping, /info, …) are not counted as sensitive. Legacy HTTP/1.x is reported but weighs 0 in Transport security — it is not a security finding.

The insufficient-data gate

A pillar whose sample is below its minimum is marked insufficient data: it gets grade N/A, shows its provisional score for reference, and is excluded — the overall score is the weighted mean of the remaining pillars with their weights renormalised. When every pillar is excluded, the score is empty (N/A) rather than a misleading number. A quiet window therefore never produces an A (or an F) from a handful of requests.

See Discovery Dashboards for the dashboard itself.

Flag classes​

Independently of the axis, each flag carries a class — the dimension it belongs to. The Risk dashboard breaks findings down by class:

ClassWhat it covers
authMissing, weak, or plaintext credentials
attack_patternBehavioural abuse — brute force, enumeration, scanning, replay, impossible travel
transportConnection-layer and browser hygiene — plain HTTP, weak TLS, HSTS, CORS, cookies, legacy protocol
data_leakSensitive-data exposure — PII observed, credentials in the query, oversized responses
discoveryContextual surface signals — internal vs external host, sensitive path keywords, version banners
behaviorResponse-status and baseline signals — 4xx/5xx, latency / error-rate anomalies, geo change
consistencyThe same endpoint behaving differently across events — auth_inconsistent, mixed_auth_schemes

How to prioritize​

Read the two axes together as a 2×2:

Low exposureHigh exposure
Low threat✅ Clean🔵 Boring but open → harden
High threat🔴 Solid but under attack⛔ Open & under attack — top priority
  • High Threat + High Exposure first — open and actively attacked.
  • High Exposure, Low Threat — "boring but open": no attacker yet, but a standing weakness. Fix the hygiene (TLS, auth, headers) before it's found.
  • High Threat, Low Exposure — a solid endpoint under attack; lean on rate limits / RBAC and watch it.

Sort the endpoints view by Threat to find what's under attack, by Exposure to find what to harden.

Resetting scores (admin)​

Admins/Owners have two levers, useful after a fix or a collector scoring change:

  • Rebaseline (project-wide, from the Listeners tab) — sets max_risk_score and max_posture_score to 0 and stamps scores_reset_at = now on every endpoint, so every flag seen before the rebaseline becomes historical. It also clears the accepted-anonymous and anonymous-refusal markers, the stored auth_inconsistent / unauthenticated entries and the CORS-reflection evidence, so those findings are re-learned under the current rules. Discovery metadata (query-parameter names, TLS-proxy evidence) is kept.
  • Reset counters & risk (single endpoint, from its detail page) — zeroes the endpoint's counters and scores, empties its flags, PII categories, endpoint categories, consumers and last-seen evidence, and stamps scores_reset_at.

Neither deletes the endpoint; the collector re-accumulates from the next event. For a windowed answer without resetting, use the current posture panel.

Video tutorial

Short, hands-on videos showing this feature working for real. English audio, English and Turkish subtitles. All video tutorials →

API Discovery in Depth — Findings, Risks and CoverageYouTube ↗